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On the Relevance of Earnings Components in
Valuation and Forecasting
Abstract
This paper articulates the links between relevance of an earnings component
in forecasting (abnormal) earnings and its relevance in valuation in a nonlin-
ear framework. The analysis shows that forecasting relevance does not imply
valuation relevance even though valuation irrelevance is implied by forecast-
ing irrelevance. Firstly, I consider an accounting information system where
earnings components add upto a fully informative earnings number. Sec-
ondly, I analyze two accounting systems where a coreearnings component
is the relevant earnings construct for valuation and the second earnings com-
ponent is irrelevant but may be predictable and relevant in forecasting other
accounting items. I nd that dividend displacement e¤ect on earnings and
the dynamics of individual earnings components are critical in this analysis.
Keywords: valuation, forecasting, earnings components, residual income
valuation model
JEL: G17, G32, M41
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1 Introduction
Financial analysts and empirical nancial accounting researchers often focus
on the valuation relevance and forecasting ability of earnings components.
Perhaps surprisingly, theoretical equity valuation models provide only lim-
ited guidance on the appropriate specication of tests of informational rel-
evance of earnings components. A valuation irrelevant accounting variable
can be forecasting relevant to the expected future earnings. Dividends are
examples of such a variable in the Miller and Modigliani (1961) framework.
Dividends paid a¤ect future earnings expectations through the dividend dis-
placement e¤ect - dividends reduce book equity from which future earnings
are generated. However, a valuation irrelevant earnings component can be
also forecasting irrelevant if it is unpredictable (Ohlson 1999). A legitimate
question is that under what conditions a forecasting relevant earnings com-
ponent is also valuation relevant.
It has long been recognized that equity value is a nonlinear function of
accounting and non-accounting numbers. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997)
document a nonlinear relation between equity market value and net income,
a result they attribute to the e¤ects of an adaptation option applicable to
lower levels of protability. A rms ability to adapt its investment opportu-
nity set to alternative uses represents a potentially valuable option that will
be reected in the market value of its equity (see, for example, Lee and Lee
2010). Consistent with economic intuition that capital follows protability,
Biddle et al. (2001) develop model and show convex relations between future
and current (abnormal) earnings, and between unrecorded goodwill (market
value added) and current abnormal earnings. Zhang (2000) considers the
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e¤ects of contingent investments on the properties of the valuation function
where rms have both growth and adaptation options.1 A nonlinear valua-
tion model necessarily leads to a nonlinear earnings information dynamic in a
no-arbitrage economy. However, existing literature does not address the rele-
vance of earnings components in valuation and forecasting of future earnings
in a more general nonlinear setting.2 In this paper, I analyze the relation-
ship between informational relevance of an earnings component in valuation
and forecasting starting from an equity valuation model that incorporates
real operating options such as investment growth options and abandonment
options.
The residual income valuation model (RIVM) establishes a fundamental
link between valuation and forecasting, the object of forecasting being ab-
normal earnings. An earnings component is dened in Ohlson (1999) as irrel-
evant if it may be combined with another accounting item, or dropped from
the information set, without loss of information for forecasting subsequent
period abnormal earnings (forecasting irrelevance) or for valuation (valua-
tion irrelevance). Under a specied linear accounting system, it is shown
1Other studies also document related non-linearities include Barth et al (1998), Berger
et al. (1996), and Subramanyam and Wild (1996).
2Although prior literature challenges the empirical validity of the Ohlson (1995) model,
it focuses on linear abnormal earnings information dynamics and corresponding linear val-
uation model. For example, Callen and Morel (2001) nd that the extension of AR(1) to
AR(2) process of abnormal earnings does not explain severe underestimation of market
prices. Tsay et al. (2008) implement Ohlson (1995) model with other informationincor-
porating abnormal earnings information itself in a linear fashion. Higgins (2011) attempts
to adjust for serial correlation in the residual income valuation model and improve the
accuracy of forecasts of stock prices.
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that when an earnings component can be netted o¤ with dividends any two
of the following three imply the third: (i) unpredictability; (ii) forecasting
irrelevance to next period abnormal earnings; (iii) valuation irrelevance. By
introducing a distinction between coreand transitoryearnings, which is
dened to be unpredictable and irrelevant in forecasting abnormal earnings,
the transitory component is consequently irrelevant in valuation and core
(abnormal) earnings is the only earnings component necessary for valuation.
Similarly, Feltham and Ohlson (1995) justify the disaggregation of earnings
and book value into nancial and operating components, based on the as-
sumed lack of predictability of abnormal earnings from nancial activities.
Likewise, other analysis of the valuation-forecasting link in the context of
earnings components has so far been limited to valuation irrelevant earnings
components in a linear information framework (Stark 1997).3 My analysis is
similar in the spirit of Pope and Wang (2005) who analyze the valuation and
forecasting links of earnings components in a linear framework. However, I
extend this line of research to a more general nonlinear setting in which (i) a
valuation irrelevant earnings component may forecast other accounting items
and may itself be predictable; (ii) a forecasting relevant earnings component
is also valuation relevant.
I show in a general setup that a valuation irrelevant earnings component
is not necessarily irrelevant in forecasting future abnormal earnings outcomes
although forecasting irrelevance of an earnings component implies valuation
3Stark (1997) shows that an earnings component is irrelevant in linear valuation if
it has no predictive ability for other accounting items. Ohlson (1999) presents a linear
model where a transitoryearnings component is irrelevant in valuation if it is irrelevant
in forecasting abnormal earnings and if it is, itself, unpredictable.
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irrelevance. I emphasize on informational relevance of an earnings compo-
nent in forecasting in all future period abnormal earnings as indicated in
the residual income valuation model. Assuming the clean surplus accounting
and no arbitrage condition, my analysis suggests the importance of dividend
displacement e¤ect on value and on earnings when discussing informational
relevance of an earnings component. Dividend displacement e¤ect is char-
acterized by whether the marginal e¤ect of dividends on the expected sub-
sequent period earnings is equal to (negative) cost of equity capital, and
whether there exists an one-for-one trade-o¤ between current dividends and
market value. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Ashton et al. (2004) argue
that a rms real (adaptation) value will in general be a¤ected by its divi-
dend policy. If dividend displacement e¤ect does not holds due to reasons
such as changes in investment opportunity set or conservative accounting, an
earnings component via dividend policy may be forecasting relevant to the
expected future earnings even if it is valuation irrelevant. If both dividend
displacement e¤ects hold, I show that earnings components being aggregated
in valuation implies, and is implied by earnings components being aggregated
in forecasting all future expected abnormal earnings under some plausible
conditions. When both dividend displacement e¤ects hold and dividends
have no e¤ect on an earnings component, I nd that the predictability of the
earnings component to itself is critical to determine the forecasting relevance
if it is valuation irrelevant. Collectively, my analysis is built on two steps.
Firstly, I explore the implication of dividend displacement. Secondly, I pay
attentions on the role of the earnings component on dividend policy.
This paper di¤ers from the relevant literature in a number of ways. First,
6
unlike Pope and Wang (2005) who extend Ohlson (1995, 1999) by examin-
ing the role of accounting conservatism on valuation and forecasting,4 my
analysis is motivated by the existence of a nonlinear relation between equity
market value and accounting observables due to real growth and adaptation
options. The role of an earnings component in a linear information system
is clearly di¤erent from that in a nonlinear system. Second, while earn-
ings components may be co-dependent, I show that interdependence between
earnings components in a nonlinear setup under dirty surplus accounting can
be much more complicated than that documented in Pope and Wang (1995).
The trade-o¤ between two earnings components may depend on core abnor-
mal earnings. Third, while Pope and Wang (2005) investigate dirty surplus
accounting, where earnings component is combined with contemporaneous
dividends without information loss in valuation and forecasting, I recast it in
a nonlinear setup and examine an additional kind of dirty surplus account-
ing, where earnings component has prior period adjustment. Fourth, to my
knowledge, this is the rst to apply the chain ruleon uncertain accounting
numbers in accounting based equity valuation research.
The results have potential implications for the design and specication
of empirical tests of informational relevance of other comprehensive income
itemsunder SFAS 130/IAS 1 and unrealized gains/losses of derivative instru-
ments under FAS 133/IAS 39, as well as prior period earnings adjustments
including reclassication of gains/losses in cash ow hedging.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 1 I de-
4They argue that conservatism acts as an adjustment to the book value anchor in the
abnormal earnings-based equity valuation.
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ne informational (ir)relevance in forecasting and valuation; In Section 2 I
present my analysis of the links between valuation irrelevance and forecasting
irrelevance in a general model setup; In Section 3 I discuss the implications
of the analysis and conclude the paper.
2 Assumptions and Denitions of Informa-
tional Relevance
My model setup follows Ohlson (1999). I assume that the set of account-
ing items in period t nancial statements comprises fx1t; x2t; dt; btg; where
x1t and x2t are two earnings components in period t summing to aggregate
earnings (or comprehensive income), xt ( x1t + x2t); dt is dividends paid
(net of new equity contributions) in period t; and bt is equity book value
at t: The evolution of accounting information follows a Markovian process.
I denote earnings component x1 as core earningswhen I analyze dirty
surplus earnings.
I make the following three basic assumptions:
A1. The rm is valued in a risk-neutral, arbitrage-free market. This implies
that Et[Pt+1+ dt+1] = RPt; where Pt is the value of the rm at the end
of period t and R equals one plus the risk-free interest rate. Et denotes
expectations based on all available information at time t.
A2 The clean surplus accounting relation holds (CSR):
bt = bt 1 + x1t + x2t   dt;
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where bt is book value at the end of period t. Similar to Ohlson (1995),
I also introduce three mathematical restrictions on CSR originating in
the accounting for ownersequity: (i) @bt=@dt =  1; (ii) @x1t=@dt = 0;
and (iii) @x2t=@dt = 0: Restriction (i) indicates that dividend payments
reduce closing book value dollar-for-dollar, while restrictions (ii) and
(iii) indicate that components of earnings are independent of contem-
poraneous dividend payments.
A3. Dividends reduce contemporaneous market value one-for-one, @Pt=@dt =
 1: I refer to this as the dividend displacement e¤ect on valuation. This
is consistent with Miller and Modigliani (1961).
In Ohlson (1995) and subsequent analysis (Ohlson 1999; Ohlson and
Juettner-Nauroth 2005; Ohlson and Gao 2006), the marginal e¤ect of divi-
dends on the expected subsequent period earnings is assumed or implied to
be equal to (negative) cost of equity capital, @Et[x+1]=@d =  (R  1) for
any   t. I refer to this as dividend displacement e¤ect on earnings.
Given dividends here are net new capital contribution, dividend displace-
ment e¤ect on earnings also means that the marginal contribution per dollar
of new capital to next period expected accounting earnings is equal to the
cost of equity capital. I will show that dividend displacement e¤ect has a
paramount role in analyzing the informational relevance of earnings compo-
nents in valuation and forecasting. I start my analysis with the following
observations.
Observation 1. Assume A1, A2 and A3. Dividend displacement e¤ect
on earnings implies (i).
@E [xa+1]
@d
= 0 for any   t; i.e. dividends do not
a¤ect future abnormal earnings, where xa+1  x+1   (R   1)b is period
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 abnormal earnings or residual income; (ii) Dividends have no e¤ect on
unrecorded subsequent period goodwill, i.e., @E [P+1 b+1]
@d
= 0:
The rst part of the observation is based on the concepts of abnormal
earnings, dividend displacement e¤ect on earnings and A2. The second part
of the observation is an application of the residual income valuation model
(RIVM). It is wellknown from Edwards and Bell (1961), Peasnell (1982)
and Ohlson (1989, 1995) that the RIVM follows directly from A1 and A2:
Pt = bt +
1X
=1
R Et[xat+ ]: (1)
It follows that abnormal earnings can be written as E [xa+1] = R(P  
b )   E [P+1   b+1]; abnormal growth of accounting goodwill. Hence we
have that
@E [xa+1]
@d
= @E [P+1 b+1]
@d
= 0; for any   t; i.e. dividends have no
e¤ect on unrecorded subsequent period goodwill.
Accounting goodwill results from conservatism in accounting for assets in
place from past transactions and from the value of unrecognized assets. The
observation e¤ectively says that the expected market value of unrecognized
assets is independent of dividend paid. This is reasonable and is in the
spirit of Modigliani and Miller (1961). There is no reason to expect that
dividends paid will result in impairment of assets in place or a¤ect the market
value of unrecognized assets for a perceived investment policy and investment
opportunity set.
If we dene expected economic earnings as E [P+1+ d+1 P ]; then we
have the following observation.
Observation 2. Assume A1, A2 and A3. If dividend displacement e¤ect
on earnings holds, then the marginal e¤ects of dividends on the (subsequent
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period) expected economic earnings is equal to the expected accounting earn-
ings, i.e., @E [P+1+d+1 P ]
@d
=  (R  1) = @E [x+1]
@d
= @E [b+1+d+1 b ]
@d
:
The rst and second equalities follow A1, A3 and the concept of dividend
displacement e¤ect on earnings. The last equality is applying the clean sur-
plus accounting identity (A2). Note that dividends here are dividends net of
new capital contributions. Observation 2 implies that the expected marginal
accounting rate of return and the marginal economic rate of return on new in-
vestment are equal to the cost of equity, i.e., @E [b+1+d+1]
@d
= @E [P+1+d+1]
@d
=
 R for any   t:
Following Ohlson (1999), I dene earnings component x2t as information-
ally irrelevant if it can be combined with another accounting item without
loss of information. There are three potentially interesting cases of infor-
mational irrelevance in which x2t is combined with, respectively, x1t; dt and
bt 1 in a manner consistent with the CSR assumption A2. Firstly, my analy-
sis is concerned with aggregation of earnings components into comprehensive
(clean surplus) earnings, equivalent to the irrelevance combination (x1t+x2t):
The case of earnings components aggregation is pertinent for considering
questions such as whether operating cash ows and accruals add upto a
fully informative earnings number for valuation (forecasting), or conversely
whether operating cash ows and accruals are separately useful for valuation
(forecasting) (Barth et al. 1999, 2005).
Secondly, I consider the two dirty surplus accounting combinations
(dt   x2t) and (bt 1 + x2t). If the accounting system reports core earnings,
x1t; as the headlineearnings construct in the income statement, account-
ing may be described as dirty surplus. When the dirty surplus earnings
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component, x2t; is valuation (forecasting) irrelevant, separate knowledge of
coreearnings, x1t; alone is required for valuation (forecasting) and x2t may
be combined with, respectively, dt or bt 1 without information loss for valu-
ation (forecasting). These cases are pertinent to considering the relevance of
transitory earnings components and prior period adjustments, respectively.5
Specically, I am interested in the relevance of an earnings component
for valuation and for forecasting future (abnormal) earnings in each of fol-
lowing three information sets Ij(j = 1; 2; 3) when compared to the primitive
information set, I0t ={x1t; x2t; bt; dt}:6
I1t = fx1t + x2t; bt; dtg = fxat ; bt; dtg,
I2t = fx1t; bt; dt   x2tg = fxa1t; bt; dt   x2tg, where xa1t = x1t   (R  1)bt 1:
I3t = fx1t; bt; dtg = fxa1t; bt; dtg, where xa1t = x1t   (R  1)(bt 1 + x2t):
I dene earnings components as informationally irrelevant in forecasting
if E[xa jI1t] = E[xa jI0t] for all  > t; and denote this form of forecasting
irrelevance FI-1. If E[xa jI2t] = E[xa jI0t] for all  > t; I refer to this form of
forecasting irrelevance as FI-2. If E[xa jI3t] = E[xa jI0t] for all  > t; I call
this form of forecasting irrelevance FI-3. Correspondingly, in the aggregation
case, earnings components are informationally irrelevant in valuation when
5Many contemporary policy debates surround the relevance of accounting items, in-
cluding the treatment of unrealized gains and losses on marketable securities and nan-
cial instruments, changes in the cumulative foreign currency translation adjustment, and
changes in the values of pension liabilities and assets (Dhaliwal et al. 1999; Chambers et
al. 2007; Schipper 2007; Bamber et al. 2010).
6Following the approach of Ohlson (1995, 1999), I could allow for an additional variable
reecting other informationat time t that is not captured by the current accounting vari-
ables. As long as it is contemporaneously uncorrelated with the other variables included
in the model, our main results would be una¤ected.
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P (x1t+x2t; bt; dt) = P (x1t; x2t; bt; dt). I label this case of valuation irrelevance
VI-1. If P (x1t; bt; dt x2t) = P (x1t; x2t; bt; dt); I refer to this form of valuation
irrelevance as VI-2. If P (x1t; bt; dt) = P (x1t; x2t; bt; dt); I call this form of
valuation irrelevance VI-3.
I evaluate the informational relevance of earnings components for both
valuation and forecasting future abnormal earnings from the striking link in
RIVM, which immediately leads to the following observation.
Observation 3. Assume A1 and A2. If an accounting item is irrelevant
in forecasting abnormal earnings realizations then it is also irrelevant in val-
uation in corresponding type. Specically, FI-1/FI-2/FI-3 imply respectively
VI-1/VI-2/VI-3.
In other words, if an earnings component is valuation relevant (in the
sense of VI-j failure), then it must be forecasting relevant (in the sense of
FI-j failure) (j = 1; 2; 3). However, the converse is not necessarily true.
Valuation irrelevance generally imposes weaker restrictions on the informa-
tion dynamics than forecasting irrelevance, such that an earnings component
can be irrelevant in valuation but still play a role in forecasting (abnormal)
earnings.
When @Et[xat+1]=@dt 6= 0; the above analysis indicates that @Et[xt+1]=@dt >
(<) (R 1) represents a marginal opportunity loss (gain) or a lower (higher)
marginal reinvestment return on retained earnings in economic terms. Bi-
ased accounting may understate (overstate) expected earnings, such that
@Et[xt+1]=@dt 6=  (R   1) (Pope and Wang 2005). When dividend dis-
placement e¤ect on earnings does not hold, an earnings component may be
forecasting relevant if future dividends depend on this earnings component,
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e.g. @Et[dt+1]=@x2t 6= 0. As a consequence x2t is relevant for forecasting fu-
ture abnormal earnings even if x2t is valuation irrelevant. My main interest
here is to examine when a forecasting relevant earnings component is also
valuation relevant or equivalently a valuation irrelevant earnings component
is also forecasting irrelevant.
3 Informational (Ir)relevance of Earnings Com-
ponents in Valuation and Forecasting
In order to establish associations between the value of equity and currently
observable accounting numbers, prior studies have often assumed a linear
abnormal earnings dynamics and have then derived closed-form linear val-
uation expressions.7 In contrast, I adopt a similar approach to Pope and
Wang (2005), who assume a linear valuation model and then examine the
implications for the abnormal earnings dynamics and other model proper-
ties. However, unlike Pope and Wang, my valuation model is a nonlinear
function of accounting observables. Specically, I start from a general valu-
ation model with one earnings component in the form of VI-j (j = 1; 2; 3)
and then identify the implied information dynamics for abnormal earnings
in my model setup. Based on the information dynamics I further identify
conditions that lead to the forecasting irrelevance FI-j (j = 1   3) of the
earnings component. I discuss each form of informational relevance in turn
next.
7For example, Ohlson (1995), Feltham and Ohlson (1995, 1996), Dechow et al (1999),
Barth et al (1999, 2005) all start from linear abnormal earnings information dynamics.
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3.1 When earnings components are aggregated
The centrality of abnormal earnings expectations in valuation based on RIVM
suggests that the relation between future abnormal earnings expectations and
current information is important in analyzing informational relevance issues.
Denote G  Pt   bt; where G is a real deterministic function dened in I0
and continuously di¤erentiable.
When earnings components aggregate in valuation (VI-1), Yee (2000)
shows that the general valuation model under A1, A2 and A3 can be written
as:8
Pt = bt +G(x
a
t ; bt + dt); (2)
where G(0; 0) = 0. It is reasonable to assume G
0
1 > 0; the rst partial
derivative of G with respect to abnormal earnings is positive - in words,
market value of equity is a positive function of abnormal earnings (Ohlson
1995).
From A1, A2 and equation (2), the abnormal earnings process must sat-
isfy the following information dynamics to be consistent with VI-1 valuation
irrelevance:
E [x
a
+1] + E [G(x
a
+1; Rb + x
a
+1)] = RG(x
a
 ; b + d ): (3)
I rst explore the implications of dividend displacement for abnormal
earnings dynamics, since an earnings component may be forecasting relevant
8By assuming A1, A2 and A3, Yee (2000) shows that book value bt and dividend dt must
add in valuation of unrecorded goodwill. When other informationtakes into account, we
can rewrite valuation Pt = bt + G(xat ; bt + dt) + #t and the abnormal earnings dynamics
as E [xa+1] + E [G(x
a
+1; Rb + x
a
+1)] = RG(x
a
 ; b + d ) +R#   E [#+1]:
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for abnormal earnings via dividend policy if dividend displacement on earn-
ings is violated. I then analyze the dependence of future abnormal earnings
on the earnings component, conditional on earnings components aggregat-
ing, i.e. @E[xa jI1t]=@x2t for any  > t. For the tractability of my analysis
and without loss of generality, I assume that any higher moments of abnor-
mal earnings are independent of any accounting variables. I also assume
the solution to equation (2) exists and conditions for the chain ruleapply
throughout the paper.
Denote G
0
2 partial derivative of G(:; :) with respect to the second variable.
We can show that dividend displacement on earnings implies
E[G
(n)
2 (:; :)] = 0; for n = 1; 2; ::: (4)
where G(n)2 is the n
th-order partial derivative with respect to the second vari-
able. See the appendix for the proof. Therefore, given G(0; 0) = 0 and
equation (3), Taylor expansion gives:
Et[x
a
t+1] +G
0
1(0; 0)(Et[x
a
t+1] Rxat )
+
1
2
G001(0; 0)((Et[x
a
t+1])
2 + var(xat+1) R(xat )2) + :::
= 0; (5)
where G(n)1 is the n
th-order partial derivative with respect to the rst variable
and var(xat+1) is the variance of x
a
t+1. Hence, in the aggregation case, when
VI-1 and dividend displacement on earnings hold, then Et[xat+1] in equation
(3) can be in general expressed in terms of xat , as can Et[x
a
 ] for  > t + 1
by recursion. Note that the variance and higher moments of xat+1 are inde-
pendent of dt and x2t by assumption. Consequently, @E[xa jI1t]=@x2t = 0 for
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any  > t; i.e., x2t is FI-1 forecasting irrelevant. In other words, a forecast-
ing relevant earnings component must be valuation relevant. Moreover, the
corresponding valuation model from equations (2) and (4) is:
Pt = bt +G
0
1(0; 0)x
a
t +
1
2
G001(0; 0)(x
a
t )
2 + ::: (6)
Therefore, together with Observation 3 above, dividend displacement on
earnings implies that valuation relevance of an earnings component is equiv-
alent to forecasting relevance of the earnings component.
To make a link to prior literature, I consider the following quadratic
model:
G(xat ; bt+ dt) = 1x
a
t +2(bt+ dt)+3(x
a
t )
2 = (1+2+3x
a
t )x
a
t +2Rbt 1;
where 1 and 3  0: It describes a scenario that the persistence of abnormal
earnings depends on current period protability. This is more realistic than
a linear valuation model. Pope and Wang (2005) is a case with 3 = 0, while
Ohlson (1995) is a special case with 2 = 3 = 0. The no-arbitrage condi-
tion and the clean surplus accounting together imply the following abnormal
earnings dynamic:
E[xat+1]+(1+2)(E[x
a
t+1] Rxat )+2R(bt Rbt 1)+3(E[(xat+1)2] R(xat )2) = 0:
Di¤erentiating both sides by dividends, we have 2 = 0 if
@E[xat+1]
@dt
= 0: It
follows that
E[xat+1] + 1(E[x
a
t+1] Rxat ) + 3(E[(xat+1)2] R(xat )2) = 0:
When earnings components aggregate in valuation they are expected to
trade-o¤against each other dollar-for-dollar at the margin, @E[x1t+1]=@E[x2t+1] =
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 1. This implies that the parameters of the information dynamics governing
the two earnings components are complementary (Pope and Wang 2005).
I summarize the above result in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Assume A1, A2, A3, and dividend displacement on earn-
ings. Valuation relevance of an earnings component is equivalent to forecast-
ing relevance of the earnings component.
When dividend displacement on earnings is violated, or there exists some
period  , such that @E [xa+1]=@d 6= 0; then VI-1 does not imply FI-1. In
this case, the relevance of earnings component x2t in forecasting of abnormal
earnings will depend on the dividend policy. If x2t a¤ects future period
dividends or dividend policy, then it will be forecasting relevant even if it is
valuation irrelevant.
3.2 Dirty surplus earnings components
When a valuation irrelevant earnings component is netted o¤ against divi-
dends (VI-2), then the general valuation formula under A1, A2 and A3 can
be written as
Pt = bt +G(x
a
1t; bt + dt   x2t); (7)
where xa1t = x1t   (R   1)bt 1 is the coreabnormal earnings. Similar to
the aggregation case, from A1 and equation (7), we know that the implied
abnormal earnings dynamics must be consistent with valuation irrelevance
VI-2 as below:
E [x
a
+1] + E [G(x
a
1+1; Rb + x
a
1+1)] = RG(x
a
1 ; b + d   x2 ): (8)
Again I rst discuss the impact of dividends on the core abnormal earn-
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ings dynamics, since an earnings component may be forecasting relevant for
future core abnormal earnings via dividend policy. I then analyze the rela-
tion between future core abnormal earnings and the earnings component, i.e.
@E[xa1 jI2t]=@x2t for any  > t. For the tractability of my analysis, I assume
that any higher moments of core abnormal earnings are independent of any
accounting variables.
When dividend displacement on earnings holds and dividends have no ef-
fect on the dynamics of the dirty surplusearnings component, i.e., @E [x2+1]=@d
= 0 for any  , similar to aggregation case, equation (8) implies
E [x
a
+1] +G
0
1(0; 0)(E [x
a
1+1] Rxa1 )
+
1
2
G001(0; 0)((E [x
a
1+1])
2 + var(xa1t+1) R(xa1 )2) + :::
= 0:
where var(xa1t+1) is the variance of x
a
1t+1. It is obvious that when x2+1 is
unpredictable, i.e. E [x2+1] = 0; E [xa+1] = E [x
a
1+1] can be expressed as
a (nonlinear) function of xa1t by recursion. Consequently, x2t is forecasting
irrelevant for all future period expected (core) abnormal earnings. In general,
we can show that, for any  > t;
@E[xa jI2t]
@x2t
=
E [G
0
1]
1 + E [G
0
1]
@E[x2 jI2t]
@x2t
; (9)
@E[xa1 jI2t]
@x2t
=
 1
1 + E [G
0
1]
@E[x2 jI2t]
@x2t
: (10)
See the appendix for the proof. Therefore, when x2t is VI-2 and dividend
displacement on earnings holds, the dynamics of the component x2 ( > t)
will be the key for the relevance of x2t in forecasting (core) abnormal earnings.
Given @Et[x2 ]=@dt = 0, the earnings component x2t will not be relevant for
19
forecasting next period (core) abnormal earnings if it has no predicting role
for itself, @E[x2 jI2t]=@x2t = 0 for any  > t. On the other hand, if the
earnings component is useful in predicting itself, i.e. @E[x2 jI2t]=@x2t 6= 0 for
some  then it will be forecasting relevant for abnormal earnings.
It is also clear that under VI-2, unpredictability of x2t+1 is a su¢ cient
but not necessary condition for forecasting irrelevance of x2t. For instance,
if Et[x2t+1] can be expressed in terms of xa1t; then x2t is FI-2 forecasting
irrelevant. In other words, in contrast to Ohlson (1999), the irrelevance of
earnings component x2t in forecasting future expected abnormal earnings and
valuation does not necessarily imply that Et[x2t+1] is unpredictable.
Similar to the aggregation case, I consider the following quadratic model
as an example:
G(xa1t; bt+dt x2t) = 1xa1t+2(bt+dt x2t)+3(xa1t)2 = (1+2+3xa1t)xa1t+2Rbt 1;
where 1 and 3  0: In this valuation model, the persistence of core abnor-
mal earnings increases in current core abnormal earnings. Pope and Wang
(2005) is a case with 3 = 0, while Ohlson (1999) is a special case with
2 = 3 = 0. The no-arbitrage condition and the clean surplus accounting
together imply the following abnormal earnings dynamic:
E[xat+1]+(1+2)(E[x
a
1t+1] Rxa1t)+3(E[(xa1t+1)2] R(xa1t)2)+2R(bt Rbt 1) = 0:
Di¤erentiating both sides by dividends, we have 2 = 0 if
@E[xat+1]
@dt
= 0
and @E[x2t+1]
@dt
= 0: It follows that
E[xat+1] + 1(E[x
a
1t+1] Rxa1t) + 3(E[(xa1t+1)2] R(xa1t)2) = 0:
When an earnings component is netted o¤ with dividends in valuation,
the two earnings components are substitutes. If
@var(xa1t+1)
@E[x2t+1]
= 0; we have
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@E[x1t+1]
@E[x2t+1]
=  1
(1+1+23E[xa1t+1])
: It is clear that there is not a dollar-for-dollar
trade-o¤ between two earnings components, nor (1 + 1) dollars of x2t+1
trades o¤ against one dollar of x1t+1 as argued in Pope and Wang (2005) un-
less 3 = 0: In this simple nonlinear setup, the trade-o¤between two earnings
components increases in future core abnormal earnings.
I summarize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Assume A1, A2, A3, dividend displacement on earnings,
and dividends have no e¤ect on the dynamics of an earnings component. VI-2
of the earnings component implies FI-2 if it has no role in predicting itself.
However, when dividend displacement on earnings is violated, or the dy-
namics of an earnings component depends on dividends, @Et[x2t+1]=@dt 6= 0;
and earnings component x2t a¤ects future dividends or dividend policy such
that @E[dt+1jI2t]=@x2t 6= 0; then x2t may be forecasting relevant for (core)
abnormal earnings even if it is valuation irrelevant, i.e., VI-2 does not imply
FI-2.9
When a valuation irrelevant earnings component is combined with the
lagged book value or apparently disappears from valuation (VI-3), the analy-
sis is similar to the above discussion for VI-2. The details can be found in
the appendix.
Proposition 3: Assume A1, A2, A3, dividend displacement on earnings,
and dividends have no e¤ect on the dynamics of an earnings component. VI-
9Note that discussion in Ohlson (1999) is based on information set I0, which means
@Pt=@x2t = @bt=@x2t = 1; i.e., a dollar of earnings components adds a dollar of both
market value and book value. The notion that an earnings component has no e¤ect on
next period expected earnings if and only if it is passed on as dividends holds in our
information set I2 and VI-2 form valuation irrelevance with @Pt=@x2t = @bt=@x2t = 0.
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3 of the earnings component implies FI-3 if it is not relevant in forecasting
itself.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
The analysis of informational relevance of earnings components in valuation
and forecasting in Ohlson (1999) and Pope and Wang (2005) can be ex-
tended to non-transitory earnings and a nonlinear framework to incorporate
gains/losses. Suppose that aggregate (core) abnormal earnings at time t+1 is
associated with aggregate (core) abnormal earnings at time t via a nonlinear
function and in a Markovian system. Then the RIVM will lead to a nonlin-
ear relation between value of equity and aggregate (core) abnormal earnings
at time t. The nonlinearity of abnormal earnings and value of equity may
be characterized as option valuation components as documented in the prior
literature (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Yee 2000, 2005; Zhang 2000; Biddle
et al. 2001). Although a forecasting irrelevant earnings component is also
valuation irrelevant in corresponding type, i.e., FI-j implies VI-j (j=1,2,3 ),
Propositions 1-3 show that the converse is not generally true. I investigate
this issue by rstly considering conditions for dividend displacement, and
secondly the predictability of an earnings component for itself.
Studies concerned with testing a null hypothesis of irrelevance of earnings
components may be informed by the analysis. I show that care is required in
dening valuation relevance so as to ensure that coe¢ cient values predicted
under the null hypothesis reect the reduced form relationships. Valuation
irrelevance of an earnings component does not imply that the component
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should necessarily have a zero valuation weight in an unrestricted regression
of market value on nancial statement variables. One needs to dene infor-
mation irrelevance and the fundamental valuation relevant variables main-
tained to be su¢ cient for valuation in order to test the incremental valuation
relevance of an earnings component by focusing on the parameter restric-
tions associated with an irrelevance denition. The analysis also shows that
a one-to-one mapping between valuation relevance and forecasting relevance
should not be expected. One cannot infer valuation relevance based on ev-
idence of forecasting relevance. Nor can forecasting irrelevance be inferred
from evidence of valuation irrelevance.
Finally, my model also appears to provide a basis for understanding
some of the features of accounting practice. Although the analysis is pre-
sented in terms of two earnings components only, the intuition provides a
rationale for the emergence of detailed line item disclosures in GAAP. At
least at an anecdotal level, di¤erent line items subject to specic disclo-
sure provisions under most GAAP regimes, such as depreciation, nancing
charges, and research and development expenses, other comprehensive in-
come items, the gains/losses of nancial derivatives qualied and not qual-
ied for hedging, can be expected to have distinct information dynamics
properties. GAAP/IFRS developments in relation to line item disclosures are
usually not motivated by explicit consideration of the information dynamics.
However, it is probable that at least some such disclosure requirements arise
from an implicit belief that such items will be valued di¤erently because they
have di¤erent dynamic properties.
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5 Appendix
Proof of equation (4). Assume the relevant Leibniz integrals are well
dened. Di¤erentiate equation (3) with respect to d and x2 respectively,
for any  , applying the chain rule, we have
(1 + E [G
0
1] + E [G
0
2])
@E [x
a
+1]
@d
= RE [G
0
2] (11)
(1 + E [G
0
1] + E [G
0
2])
@E[xa+1jI1 ]
@x2
=  RE [G02]
@b
@x2
(12)
where derivatives of G01 and G
0
2 are functions of {x
a
+1; b+1 + d+1}.
When dividend displacement on earnings holds,
@E [xa+1]
@d
= 0; equation
(11) implies that E [G
0
2(:; :)] = 0 for any accounting variables and any time
period  ; which further implies that E[G(n)2 (:; :)] = 0 (n = 1; 2; :::). Equation
(12) then implies @E[xa+1jI1 ]=@x2 = 0. By recursion, equation (3) leads to
@Et[xa ]
@dt
= 0 and @Et[x
a
 jI1t]
@x2t
= 0 for any  > t:
Proof of equations (9) and (10). Di¤erentiate equation (8) with
respect to xat , we have
@E [x
a
+1]
@d
+ (E [G
0
1] + E [G
0
2])
@E [x
a
1+1]
@d
= RE [G
0
2] (13)
where G
0
1 is the partial derivative with respect to the rst variable and G
0
2
is the partial derivative with respect to the second variable: Derivatives of
G1 and G2 are functions of {xa1+1; b+1 + d+1   x2+1}. When dividend
displacement on earnings holds and dividends have no role in predicting
earnings component x2t, @E[x2+1]=@d = 0 for any  , then @E[xa1+1]=@d =
@E[xa+1]=@d   @E[x2+1]=@d = 0: Equation (13) implies E[G02(:; :)] = 0.
Since this holds for arbitrary time  and any accounting numbers, we have,
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E[G
(n)
2 (:; :)] = 0 for n = 1; 2; :::: Di¤erentiate equation (8) with respect to x2,
we further have
@E[xat+1jI2t]
@x2t
+ Et[G
0
1]
@[xa1t+1jI2t]
@x2t
= 0 (14)
By recursion, equation (8) implies @E[x
a
 jI2t]
@x2t
+ E [G
0
1]
@[xa1 jI2t]
@x2t
= 0 for any
 > t + 1: Equation (14) and @E[x
a
 jI2t]
@x2t
  @E[x2 jI2t]
@x2t
=
@[xa1 jI2t]
@x2t
further imply
equations (9) and (10).
Proof of Proposition 3.
When a valuation irrelevant earnings component is combined with the
lagged book value or apparently disappears from valuation (VI-3), then the
general valuation formula under A1, A2 and A3 can be written as
Pt = bt +G(x
a
1t; bt + dt); (15)
where xa1t = x1t   (R   1)(bt 1 + x2t): From A1 and equation (15), we know
that the implied abnormal earnings dynamics must satisfy the information
dynamics in consistent with respective valuation irrelevance VI-3 as below:
E [x
a
+1] + E[G(x
a
1+1; Rb + x
a
+1)] = RG(x
a
1 ; b + d ): (16)
Di¤erentiate equation (16) with respect to d , note that xa = x
a
1 +Rx2 ;
we obtain
(1+E [G
0
2])
@E [x
a
+1]
@d
+E [G
0
1](
@E [x
a
+1]
@d
 R@E [x2+1]
@d
) = RE [G
0
2]; (17)
where G
0
1 is the partial derivative with respect to the rst variable and G
0
2
is the partial derivative with respect to the second variable: When divi-
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dend displacement on earnings holds and @E [x2+1]=@d = 0; then equa-
tion (17) implies that E[G
0
2] = 0 for each time period  : Given G(0; 0) = 0;
E [G
(n)
2 (:; :)] = 0 for n = 1; 2; ::: and equation (16), Taylor expansion gives:
Et[x
a
t+1] +G
0
1(0; 0)(Et[x
a
1t+1] Rxa1t)
+
1
2
G001(0; 0)((Et[x
a
1t+1])
2 + var(xa1t+1) R(xa1t)2) + :::
= 0:
On the other hand, di¤erentiate equation (16) with respect to x2t, by recur-
sion, we obtain
@E[xa jI3t]
@x2t
+ E [G
0
1]
@E[xa1 jI3t]
@x2t
= 0: (18)
Note that @E[x
a
 jI3t]
@x2t
 @E[xa1 jI3t]
@x2t
= R@E(x2 jI3t)
@x2t
: Equations (17) and (18) together
imply that
@E[xa1 jI3t]
@x2t
=   R
1 + E [G
0
1]
@E[x2 jI3t]
@x2t
;
@E[xa jI3t]
@x2t
=
RE [G
0
1]
1 + E [G
0
1]
@E[x2 jI3t]
@x2t
:
Therefore, when x2t is VI-3 and dividend displacement on earnings holds and
dividends have no role in forecasting x2 , @E [x2+1]=@d = 0 for any  ; then
the earnings component will not be relevant for forecasting (core) abnormal
earnings if it has no role for predicting itself, @E[x2 jI3t]=@x2t = 0 for any  :
On the other hand, if @E[x2 jI3t]=@x2t 6= 0 for some period  , then it will be
forecasting relevant for abnormal earnings.
If dividend displacement on earnings does not hold or the dynamics of an
earnings component is a¤ected by dividends, or equivalently @Et[xat+1]=@dt 6=
0 or @Et[xa1t+1]=@dt 6= 0; then the earnings component via dividend policy,
such that @E[dt+1jI3t]=@x2t 6= 0; may be forecasting relevant even if it is valu-
ation irrelevant, i.e., VI-3 does not imply FI-3. In other words, a forecasting
relevant earnings component may not be valuation relevant.
26
Acknowledgments: I am indebted to Peter Pope for imparting his
knowledge and insights. I also appreciate the many helpful comments re-
ceived from Jim Ohlson, Ken Peasnell, Judson Caskey (discussant at the
American Accounting Association annual conference) and participants at Eu-
ropean Accounting Association Annual Congress and Imperial College Lon-
don on earlier versions of the paper.
27
6 References
Ashton D, Cooke T, Tippett M, Wang P (2004) Linear information dynamics,
aggregation, dividends and dirty surplus accounting. Account Bus Res 34:
277-299.
Bamber L, Jiang J, Petroni K, Wang I (2010) Comprehensive income:
whos afraid of performance reporting. Account Rev 85:97-126.
Barth M, Beaver W, Landsman W (1998) Relative valuation roles of
equity book value and net income as a function of nancial health. J Account
Econ 25:1-34.
Barth M, Beaver W, Hand J, Landsman W (1999) Accruals, cash ows,
and equity values. Rev Account Stud 3:205-229.
Barth M, Beaver W, Hand J, Landsman W (2005) Accruals, accounting-
based valuation models and the prediction of equity values. J Account Audit
Finance 32:435-776.
Berger P, Ofek E, Swary I (1996) Investor valuation of the abandonments
option. J Financ Econ 42:257-287.
Biddle G, Chen P, Zhang G (2001) When capital follows protability:
non-linear residual income dynamics. Rev Account Stud 6:229-265.
Burgstahler D, Dichev I (1997) Earnings, adaptation and equity value.
Account Rev 72:187-215.
Callen JL, Morel M (2001) Linear accounting valuation when abnormal
earnings are AR (2). Rev Quant Financ Acc 16:191203
Chambers D, Linsmeier T, Shakespeare C, Sougiannis T (2007) An eval-
uation of SFAS No. 130 comprehensive income disclosures. Rev Account
Stud 12:557-593.
28
Dechow P, Hutton A, Sloan R (1999) An empirical assessment of the
residual income valuation model. J Account Econ 26:1-34.
Dhaliwal D, Subramanyam K, Trezevant R (1999) Is comprehensive in-
come superior to net income as a measure of rm performance. J Account
Econ 26:43-67.
Dixit A, Pindyck R (1994) Investment under uncertainty. Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Edwards E, Bell P (1961) The theory of and measurement of business
income. University of California Press.
Feltham G, Ohlson J (1995) Valuation and clean surplus accounting for
operating and nancial activities. Contemp Account Res 11:689-732.
Feltham G, Ohlson J (1996) Uncertainty resolution and the theory of
depreciation measurement. J Account Res 34:209-234.
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) (2010) Accounting for
nancial instruments and revisions to the accounting for derivative instru-
ments and hedging activities. Exposure draft. Stanford, CT.
Higgins H (2011) Forecasting stock price with the residual income model.
Rev Quant Finan Acc 36:583604
Lee CF, Lee J (2010) Handbook of quantitative nance and risk manage-
ment, Springer.
Miller M, Modigliani F (1961) Dividend policy, growth and the valuation
of shares. J Bus 34:411-433.
Ohlson J (1989) Accounting earnings, book value, and dividends: the
theory of the clean surplus equation. in R.P. Brief and K.V. Peasnell, Clean
surplus-a link between accounting and nance (1996), New York: Garland
29
Publishing.
Ohlson J (1991) The theory of value and earnings, and an introduction
to the Ball-Brown analysis. Contemp Account Res 8:1-19.
Ohlson J (1995) Earnings, book values, and dividends in security valua-
tion. Contemp Account Res 11:661-687.
Ohlson J (1999) On transitory earnings. Rev Account Stud 3/4:145-162.
Ohlson J, Gao Z (2006) Earnings, earnings growth and value. Founda-
tions and Trends in Accounting 1:1-70.
Ohlson J, Juettner-Nauroth B (2005) Expected EPS and EPS growth as
determinants of value. Rev Account Stud 10:349365.
Peasnell K (1982) Some formal connections between economic values and
yields and accounting numbers. J Bus Financ Account 9:361-381.
Pope F, Wang P (2005) Earnings components, accounting bias and equity
valuation. Rev Account Stud 10:387-407.
Schipper K (2007) Required disclosure in nancial reports. Account Rev
82:301-326.
Stark A (1997) Linear information dynamics, dividend irrelevance, corpo-
rate valuation and the clean surplus relationship. Account Bus Res 27:219-
228.
Subramanyam K, Wild J (1993) The going concern assumption and the
informativeness of earnings. Contemp Account Res 13:251-273.
Tsay RS, Lin Y, Wang H (2008) Residual income, value-relevant informa-
tion and equity valuation: a simultaneous equations approach. Rev Quant
Financ Acc 31:331358.
Yee K (2005) Aggregation, dividend irrelevancy, and earnings-value rela-
30
tions. Contemp Account Res 22:45380.
Yee K (2000) Opportunities knocking: residual income valuation of an
adaptive rm. J Account Audit Finance 15:225-266.
Zhang G (2000) Accounting information, capital investment decisions,
and equity valuation: theory and empirical implications. J Account Res
38:271-295.
31
